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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD ANDERSON, ET AL,

Petitioners and Appellants,
vs.

UTAH COUNTY AND THE BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF UTAH COUNTY,
Respondents.

No.
9549

BRIEF OF PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS

Appeal from the Judgment of the 4th District Court for
Utah County, Honorable F. W. Keller, Visiting Judge

Throughout this brief all emphasis is ours.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case is to determine whether the Utah Right to Work
Law, sometimes herein referred to as ((Law," or ((Act," applies
to membership or nonmembership in a political party, and
1
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specifically whether it was lawful under that Law for Utah
County to fire 37 men from their county jobs because they were
members of the Democratic Party.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court held that the appellants had been damaged
by their discharge but that the phrase of the Law ((labor union,
labor organization or any other type of association" did not
include political parties, and therefore denied the men the
damages and injunctive relief which they sought.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants, by this appeal, seek to be reinstated in their
jobs and to be compensated for the damage caused them by
their being discharged as assessed and determined by the
trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Wednesday, January 4, 1961, the Board of Commissioners of Utah County fired all but three of its highway
department employees (R. 48, p 8). Of the three remaining,
one was the supervisor of the north crew, one was the supervisor of the south crew, and the other was the book and time
keeper for the department. Their employment was terminated
on Friday, two days later (R. 48, pp 73-4; R. 48, pp 44-6). ·
All employees so fired were Democrats and had campaigned
for the Democratic Party in the previous fall election.
2
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The Board of Commissioners then proceeded to fill the
job vacancies in the Highway Department with people who
were Republicans, and who were able to obtain, and did obtain,
the Utah County Republican Party endorsement, a prerequisite
for such employment (R. 48, pp 42, 43, 47).
On Tuesday, January 3, 1961, the day before the wholesale
firings, the political composition of the Board of Commissioners
had changed from Democratic to Republican, when Democrat
Marcellus Neilsen, having lost the election in November, 1960,
relinquished his position on the Board to the successful Republican candidate, Sterling Jones. The other commissioners
were Republican Rulon Nichols, who had just been re-elected
and Democrat Marion Hinckley, a holdover incumbent.
On February 14, 1961, the petitioners filed this action
seeking to be reinstated in their jobs and to be given a judgment
for damages for their loss of wages. Their action was predicated
on the Utah Right to Work Law, Laws of Utah, 1955, Chapter
54; Title 34, Chapter 16 U.C.A., 1953. It was their position
that this law prevented the County from firing them if a reason
for their discharge was that they were members of any particular ccassociation"; and they asserted that the reason they
were fired was because they were members of the Democratic
Party and not members of the Republican Party ana that such
parties were associations within the meaning of the Law.
Respondents moved the Court to dismiss the case because
petitioners had failed to state a cause of action. In support
of the motion it was argued that the Legislature did not intend
a political party to come within the meaning of the word
ccassociation"' and that if it did mean to include political
3
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parties, then the law was unconstitutional. The Court denied
the motion and the case was tried before Judge Keller of the
Seventh Judicial District at the instance and request of the
presiding judge of the Fourth District.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court orally announced
certain findings of fact (R. 48, p. 439-445), including a finding
of damages for the thirty-seven petitioners who appeared at the
trial to prosecute their claims, and also found as a reason for
their discharge the fact that they were members of the Democratic Party. Having found the issues of fact sufficiently in
favor of the petitioners to allow them relief from their loss of
wages and other damages if the law applied to their circumstances, the Court then, after taking the matter under advisement, held against them as to the law by reversing the position
which the Court, with another judge sitting, had taken when
it denied- respondents' Motion to Dismiss.
In its Memorandum Decision the Court (R. 27-29) decides
the case solely on the meaning of ccassociation". rry his case,"
says the Court, rrturns upon what the Court finds the legislative
intention to be in its use of the words rany other type of association' as used in 34-16-2 UCA, 1953" (R. 27). The Court
then ruled that political parties were not meant to be included
within the phrase in question, and therefore denied petitioners
the relief which they sought. The ensuing argument shall be
limited to the sole point upon which the case turns, viz., the
meaning of the phrase ((labor union, labor organization, or
any other type of association."
First, however, we herewith quote the pertinent sections
of the Law which, in the view of appellants, have been violated

4
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by the respondents, together with the remedies provided therefor:

"34-16-4. Any express or implied agreement, understanding or practice between any employer and any
labor union, labor organization or any type of association, whereby any person not a member of such union,
organization or any other type of association shall be
denied the right to work for an employer, or whereby
membership or nonmembership in such labor union,
labor organization or any other type of association
is made a condition of employment or continuation of
employment by such employer, or whereby any such
union, organization or any other type of association
acquires an employment monopoly in any <:,nterprise
or industry, is hereby declared to be an illegal combination or conspiracy and against public policy."
cc34-16-5. Any express or implied agreement, understanding or practice which is designed to cause or
require, or has the effect of causing or requiring, any
employer or labor union, labor organization or any
other type of association, whether or not a party thereto,
to violate any provision of this act is hereby declared
an illegal agreement, understanding, or practice and
contrary to public policy."
cc34-16-8. No employer shall require any person to
become or remain a member of any labor union, labor
organization or any other type of association as a condition of employment or continuation of employment
by such employer."
cc34-16-9. No employer shall require any person to
abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union,
labor organization or any other type of association as
a condition of employment or continuation of employment."
cc34-16-11. Any employer, person, firm, association,
5
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corporation, employee, labor union, labor organization
or any other type of association injured as a result of
any violation or threatened violation of any provision
of this act or threatened with any such violation shall
be entitled to injunctive relief against any and all
violators or persons threatening violation, and also to
recover from such violator or violators, or person or
persons, any and all damages of any character cognizable at common law resulting from such violations
or threatened violations. Such remedies shall be independent of and in addition to the penalties and remedies prescribed in other provisions of this act.''

(( 34-16-12. In addition to the penal provisions of
this act, any person, firm, corporation, association, or
any labor union, labor organization or any other type
of association, or any officer, representative, agent or
member thereof may be restrained by injunction from
doing or continuing to do any of the matters and things
prohibited by this act."
((34-16-13. Any person who may be denied employment or be deprived of continuation of his employment
in violation of this act shall be entitled to recover from
such employer and from any other person, firm, corporation or association acting in concert with him by
appropriate action in the courts of this state such
damages as he may have sustained by reason of such
denial or deprivation of employment."

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION
INDICATES THAT THE RULING HEREIN IS IN ERROR
IN THAT IT WAS AN UNWARRANTED JUDICIAL
VETO OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION.
6
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In ruling that a political party was not intended to be
included in the word "association", the trial Court gives the
following reasons for its decision (R. 28-29) :
1. The phrase "any other type of association" 1s not

explicit upon the question of whether political parties are
included.
2. It is only because the language may be construed as

all inclusive that we draw the implication that political parties
are included.
3. Although a political party is an association, it is one
which furthers a political end.
4. To accept the language literally to include political
parties would be imputing an unreasonable and absurd intention upon the part of the Legislature.
5. We have no statutory law fixing the standards and
tenure of public employees.
6. It has been common to elect a person to office in order
to provide other and different employees in a particular public
employment.
We respectfully observe that these reasons appear to us
to accomplish no more than to reveal the trial Court's personal
opposition and disagreement with the legislative and executive
action in enacting this Law. This is not unexpected, for few
laws in the history of our country have, at once, stirred such
vigorous acceptance and opposition as has this type of legislation. Of those who study such laws and their effects, there
are few who view them passively. And if such be true of the
7
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ordinary teright-to-work" law, much more is it true as to Utah's
right-to-work Law, which clearly introduces a new but nevertheless logical and reasonable element v~hich is unique among
such laws.
Even so, the trial Court is not within its appropriate powers
and rights when it exercises a veto power over legislation
which has been duly enacted into law. In the above reasons
for the Court's decision, we fail to find any valid rule of interpretation or other legal basis to support or justify the ruling.
What we do find, in our view, is nothing more nor less than
a substitution of judicial judgment for that of the Legislature.
As to reason 1, 2, 3 and 4, what the Court admits therein
would appear to support our position. We are quite willing
to concede that the appellants' case does rest upon the premise
that the phrase teor any other type of association" is all inclusive and that a political party is one of many types of association; and, we assert, that the Legislature in its desire to be
Hall inclusive" used general language rather than explicit"
language to avoid the risk of overlooking some particular type
of association in an enumeration. All that the trial Court
does in its first four reasons for its decision is to admit these
principles, then disagree with the logical result. We are here
forced to observe that the same Court, with the presiding
judge sitting, did not think it unreasonable and absurd that
political parties were necessarily included in the phrase uor
any other type of association" when it denied the County's
Motion to Dismiss. This "unreasonable and absurd" point
of view was, by the County, strongly urged upon the Court
in support of its motion.
tC
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As to reason 5, we agree that there is no statutory law
fixing the standards and tenure of public employees. But
neither are there any statutory standards and tenure as to all
the other people who are affected by the Law. When a law
regulates an area of activity it does not follow that the law
is invalid because it does not regulate other matters that may
possibly be associated therewith, nor is there a rule of interpretation that would even suggest it. Otherwise this Law
would have to be nullified not only as to public employees,
but also as to all other employees who are affected by it, thus
nullifying the entire Act.
As to reason 6, there is nothing to prevent a change of
employees in public employment if the change is not brought
about because of one's affiliation wtih some type of association
-a matter which is, and which ought to be recognized as, quite
irrelevant to that employment, whether public or private.
And what the trial Court and all the rest of us have become
accustomed to in the past in this respect will have to be altered
as a result of our unique Right to Work Law, just as we are
constantly modifying our habits by conforming to new and
different rules in a constantly changing and dynamic society.
The change may be more good than bad, or more bad than
good, and, with time and testing, some social experiments
will be eliminated or changed, but that is the nature, indeed
the vitality, of a living and growing society; and it is not,
under our constitutional form of government, the prerogative
of a court to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature.
Time may, or may not, prove the trial Court to be more
responsive to the public feeling as to this Law than the Legislature, but that is not the issue. Whether the Law is popular

9
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or not, it is the law, and while it stands, unrepealed by the
Legislature, it ought not to be judicially vetoed as to any part
of it just because that part seems ((absurd" to one of the
judges of the Trial Court. For the part that seems absurd
to one branch of the Court does not appear absurd to another
branch of the same Court; and it is to many other minds the
most sensible part of the Law as we shall hereinafter discuss.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in A.F.L.
v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, which was one
of the cases involving the constitutionality of a rignt-to-work
statute, makes an effective plea for judicial restraint in nullifying legislative acts when he wrote:
((Even where the social undesirability of a law may
be convincingly urged, invalidation of the law by
a court debilitates popular democratic government.
Most laws dealing with economic and social problems
are matters of trial and error. * * * But even if a
law is found wanting on trial, it is better that its
defects should be demonstrated and removed than that
the law should be aborted by judical fiat. Such an
assertion of judicial power deflects responsibility from
those on whom in a democratic society it ultimately
rests-the people.''
Concluding his thinking on this subject, Justice Frankfurther says:
((Matters of policy, however, are by definition matters
which demand the resolution of conflicts of value, and
the elements of conflicting values are largely imponderable. Assessment of their competing worth involves
differences of feeling; it is also an exercise in prophecy.
Obviously the proper forum for mediating a clash of
feelings and rendering a prophetic judgment is the
10
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body chosen for those purposes by the people. Its
functions can be assumed by this Court only in disregard of the historic limits of the Constitution."
In support of its interpretation, the Court cites the case
of Rowley vs. Public Service Commission, 112 Utah 116, 185
Pac. 2nd 9 37. We fail to see any similarity of the problems
of interpretation between that case and this case. We do,
however, agree with the rules of interpretation therein announced and believe that such rules support our case. We
refer especially to the following rule therein announced:
t(We have not overlooked the legal principle that
if the intent of the legislature is by the statute made
clear and certain, even though we rna y believe the
legislation absurd and undesirable, we cannot substitute
the judgment of the court for the judgment of the
legislature. On the other hand, when the legislative
intent is not clear and certain, and a literal interpretation of the language of the statute gives an absurd
result, then the court is justified in searching the enactment for further indications of legislative intent. These
indications can be determined by the wording of the
act or by considering the underlying reasons and
necessity of the amendments and the purposes to be
accomplished.''
The Trial Court admits that the intent of the Legislature
is made clear and certain. It says: eel have arrived at the conclusion that to accept literally the language of this section
would result in finding an unreasonable and absurd intention
on the part of the Legislature * * * ." (R. 28).
The Court also cites the case of Norvill vs. State Tax
Commission, 98 Utah 170; 97 Pac. 2nd 937, another case
where the factual problem is, we believe, dissimilar from the
11
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instant case but wherein rules of interpretation are announced
with which we agree. We refer to the quotation by the Court
from Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 24, Page
320 (also quoted in the Rowley case):
tcin the exposition of a statute the intention of the
lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the
terms; and its reason and intention will prevail over
the strict letter. When the words are not explicit, the
intention is to be collected from the context; from
the occasion and necessity of the law; from the mischief
felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to
be taken or presumed according to what is consonant
with reason and good discretion."
It is among the purposes of this brief to show that the
language of the statute clearly includes political parties within
the meaning of tcassociation" as used in the Act, and that
such meaning is reasonable, was so intended by the Legislature,
that it dealt with the mischief felt and the remedy in view,
and that the strong statement of public policy in the Act
can be fully accomplished only by such an interpretation.

POINT II
THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL RULES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION AND INTENT REQUIRE THE INCLUSION OF ALL TYPES OF ASSOCIATIONS WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ACT.
This Court has, many times, been required to rule on
problems of statutory intent and construction. From a review
of these cases we believe the following rules of interpretation
clearly appear:
12
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1. That unless a statute is ambiguous, the meaning thereof

must be found in the words of the Act itself.
2. That words are used in their ordinary meaning and if

any question arises as to their meaning, they should be interpreted liberally to make the law valid.
3. That special consideration be given to the declared
purpose and policy of the Legislature.
4. That every word be given effect, and, if possible, the
Court should avoid the rendering of any words ineffective or
nugatory.
5. That the use of the word ccor" 1n a ser1es does not
unify the parts, but separates them.
6. When the intent of the Legislature is made clear and
certain, even though absurd and undesirable in the eyes of
the Court, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the Legislature.
Under Point I we have discussed the last of the rules
above listed. We shall now refer to some cases and authorities
which support the other rules of construction as listed .
. In Spring Canyon Coal Company vs. Industrial Commission of Utah et al, 74 Utah 103, 116, 277 Pacific 206, this
Court says:
Ctit is a cardinal principal of uniform application
in the construction or interpretation of a statute that
the legislative intent as determined from the language
used is of primary and controlling importance. When
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
courts are bound by such language. They may not
13
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resort to rules of statutory construction and interpretation to defeat the clear and definite meaning of the
language used in a statute."
The general statement of the rule is also found in 50
Am Jur (Statutes) Paragraph 227, Page 210:
((The only mode in which the will of a legislature
is spoken, is in the statute itself. Hence, in the construction of statutes, it is the legislative intent manifested in the statute that is of importance, and such
intent must be determined primarily from the language
of the statute, which affords the best means of its
exposition. Indeed, it is the duty of the courts to give
a statute the interpretation its language calls for, where
this can reasonably be done, and the general rule is
that no intent may be imputed to the legislature in
the enactment of a law other than such as is supported
by the face of the law itself. The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
apart from the words. A statute is to be taken, construed, and applied in the form enacted, and so declared, announced, and expounded. Popular demand
as to the enforcement of a law adds nothing to, and
detracts nothing from, the duty of the court to construe the law as it is. As a reason for these rules, it has
been declared that the le gislautre must be assumed or
presumed to know the meaning of u·ords, to have used
the words of a statute advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of the words found in the statute:"'
An illustration of how the Court interpreted the meaning
of the word Hcapital" is found in the case of Parkinson vs.
State Bank of Millard County et al, 87 Utah 278, 35 Pac.
2d 814. Plaintiff in that case contended that the word ((capital"
included all of the bank's assets. The defendant's position was
that the word ((capital" meant only the paid-up capital of
14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the original incorporators and investors, in other words "capital
stock." Revised statutes of 1933, 7-3-35, read as follows:
~(Whenever

any such bank shall accept an appointment as * * * executor * * * the capital of such bank
shall be held as security for the faithful performance

*** "
Plaintiffs claim arose as beneficiary of an estate which
the bank was administering, and it became important to
plaintiff that the word "capital" meant all of the bank's assets.
In deciding what the word ((capital" meant, the Court
considered the cases and also text book authorities, and then
concluded as follows:
ccln view of the text and judicial authorities referred
to, it, by the great weight of authority, is clear that
the term (capital' as applied to corporations generally
including banking corporations, whether the term be
regarded in a popular sense and in the common usage
of the language or in a legal sense, embraces the actual
estate including assets of the corporation, whether
money or property owned by it, and whether represented
by money paid in for shares of stock or other property
acquired and owned by the corporation. * * * Ordinarily the legislature speaks only in general terms. Its
intention and meaning primarily must be determined
from language of the statute which should be given a
liberal interpretation. Words and phrases are presumed
to have been used according to the plain, natural, and
common import and usage of the language, unless
obviously used in a technical sense.JJ
Again, in the case of Conover vs. Board of Education,
110 Utah 454, 175 Pac. 2d 209, the statute in controversy
was one which required an annual statement to be published
15
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tn a newspaper of general circulation in the school district
showing ''the moneys paid out, and for what paid, and in
county school districts, also to whom paid."
The school district contended that the part above quoted
required that it show only (Cto whom" the money was paid
and not what was paid. Conover, a taxpayer, believed that the
general import of the statute also required a showing as to
what was paid. In discussing the point, the Supreme Court
quoted from a former case, Crocket vs. Board of Education,
58 Utah 303, 199 Pac. 158, 159, as follows:
(( 'It is apparent from a reading of the statute that
it was designed for the benefit and interests of the
citizen taxpayer so that they may be informed as to
whether or not the financial affairs of the school district each year have been properly and lawfully conducted on the part of the Board of Education.

It is one of the cardinal rules of construction that
a statute must be construed with reference to the objects
sought to be accomplished by it. The mere general
statement that certain sums of money were received
and certain sums paid out on account of the support
and maintenance of the public schools affords no information to the taxpayer and subserves none of the purposes intended by the enactment of the statute under
consideration.' "
r

In harmony with the pronouncements of our own Court
is the following from 82 CJS, under the title of Statutes, Paragraph 323, Page 593:
"In construing a statute to give effect to the intent
or purpose of the legislature, the court must look to
the object to be accomplished, and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied. In ascertaining the
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intent and purpose, the court must also look to the
purpose to be subserved by the statute, and should
place such construction on it as will, if possible. effect
the purpose of the statute, and likewise according to
the judicial decisions such construction as will render
it valid even though it may be somewhat indefinite.
ccIn construing a statute to effect the legislative
purpose it should be given a reasonable construction,
or, as otherwise stated, it should be given a construction
which is sensible, practical, workable, or liberal. If a
statute is susceptible of more than one construction,
it must be given that which will best effect its purpose
rather than one which would defeat it, * * * .
nWhen the purpose of an act is expressed in clear
and unambiguous terms, this must be accepted as the
solemn declaration of the sovereign, and taken as true
unless incompatible with the meaning and e:ffect of
the statute. Accordingly, the legislative declaration of
purpose and policy is entitled to the gravest consideration, unless overthrown by facts' of record, and a
statute will, if possible, be given a construction which
is consistent with its declared purpose.''
In determining legislative intent an important principle
ts that every word in a statute is meaningful and must, if
possible, be given an interpretation which will render every
word operative. This principle is stated in the case of W rathall
vs. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 103:
ccKeeping in mind at least two rules of statutory
construction, first, if possible, every word and pt1rase
of a statute must be given effect, and no word shall be
rejected if possible to retain them and give them effect
and meaning; and, second, the intent of the legislature
must be ascertained and given effect, which intent and
meaning is to be determined primarily from the lan17
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guage of the statutes themselves, recogn1z1ng that in
so doing it is not proper to consider a word or phrase
disconnected from all parts of the act and rLcogoizjng
that words and phrases must be given their ordinary
meaning, unless it is necessary to give to particular
words or phrases a restricted or an enlarged meaning
so as to harmonize all the provisions of the statute
and make them effective. Also keeping in mind the
purpose for which the statute was enacted * * * ."
An interesting application of the above rule appears in
the case of Stevenson vs. Salt Lake City Corporation, 7 Utah
2d 28, wherein the meaning of 10-8-40 U.C.A., 1953, was
brought in question. By this statute cities are authorized
((to license, tax, regulate and suppress billiards, pool, bagatelle, pigeonhole or any other tables or implements kept or
used for similar purpose; also pin alleys or table, or ball
alleys; may also license, tax, regulate, prohibit or suppress
dance halls, dancing resorts * * * ."
Pursuant to the above statute, Salt Lake City passed an
ordinance prohibiting bagatelle, pin ball, and marble machines. The District Court held this was beyond the authority
of the city, which the Supreme Court affirmed.
((Although ordinarily the words (suppress' and
'prohibit' are somewhat synonymous in that they may
mean to stop or prevent or keep back completely, they
are clearly not meant to be synonymous in the statute
involved herein. It is a common rule of const~"uction

that U'herever possible each word in a statute must be
given a meaning, and rthat construction is fat'Ofed
which will render every u·ot·d operative, father than
one tohich nzakes some words idle and nugcttory.' 50
Am Jur, Statutes, Sec. 358, Pages 363-4. If ·\ve 'vere
to hold that the legislature intended the words '~up18
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press' and {prohibit' to be synonymous, we would have
to overlook the fact that the legislature in Sec. 10-8-4
in dealing with billiards, pool, bagatelle, etc. only
granted the cities the power to license, tax, regulate
and suppress, whereas in dealing with the subject of
dance halls, they were granted the power tJ license,
tax, regulate, prohibit or suppress. If the legislaiure
had not intended to grant different powers in the case
of amusements than in that of resorts there would
have been no necessity of dealing with them separately
in the same section.''
Our Supreme Court has a~so expressed itself on the use
of the disjunctive word nor." In Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah
2d 287, the question arose as to whether one charged with
drunkenness was required to submit himself to a blood test
under a statute providing that nany person who operates a
motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his
consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine or saliva
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood * * * ." The officer had advised the motorist that he
must submit to a blood test. The Supreme Court did not agree
with the officer. It said:
t{The words being in a series, the only connective
being the disjunctive tor', it applies to the whole
series. Therefore, the ordinary and usual meaning of
the language would be that the subject is deemed
to give his consent to a test of some one of the designated substances, or of another, but not all of them.
That is, of his breath, or of his blood, or of his urine,
or of his saliva.''
In our view, the foregoing principles of statutory construction should guide the Court in the interpretation of the
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Law in question. But we cannot leave this subject without
considering the testimony of witness J. Bracken Lee (which
appears in full in the appendix), and Petitioners' Exhibit
1 (R. 24). This evidence was offered by petitioners because the respondents and the Court had indicated some
disposition toward the view that the Law was not plain
and unambiguous on its face. We, therefore, at the trial
proceeded on the theory that if the Court and our opponents
wanted some interpretive assistance outside the language itself,
we would be happy to accommodate them. But our efforts
along this line were met by respondents' objections to Exhibit
1 which was sustained so that it was not an influence upon
the Court's decision. The Court, however, made the exhibit
"part of the record so that the Supreme Court, if this case is
appealed, may say whether or not I erred."
Exhibit 1 (R. 24) is an official communication sent out
by Governor Lee during the time he was Chief Executive of
the State of Utah explaining the Right-to-Work Law (R. 48,
p. 60). In the letter he says:
((Although it is not generally known, the Utah
'Right to Work' bill extends to any labor union, labor
organization or tany other type of association' and is
not confined to labor unions alone. It is essential that
this be understood in order to gain a proper picture
of the bill."
The trial judge, referring to other statements in the letter,
said during the trial:
((this doesn't mention political parties either. * * *
It simply says other organizations, and then he mentioned specifically others, like the Farm Bureau and
20
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Church and so on, but doesn't mention the Democratic
or Republican parties, so I don't think that I get any
aid from the letter." (R. 48, p. 66).
Exhibit 1, therefore, is an executive view of the Law
which at most means all associations other than labor organizations and at least means some associations other than labor
organizations. We submit that if the phrase (Cor any other
type of association" has a meaning that would include one
association other than labor, it must, of necessity, include all
associatons other than labor.
That executive interpretation of statutes are proper aids
to their construction is a rule well settled by this Court. Sinclair
Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission et al, 102 Utah 340;
E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563. See
also 82 C.J.S., p. 778, para. 359, and Fleming v. Mohawk
Wrecking and Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, where the U.S.
Supreme Court says:
(CSuch construction by the Chief Executive, being
both contemporaneous and consistent, is entitled to
great weight."
While we take the position that the language of the Law
is plain and unambiguous and that the foregoing rules of interpretation point clearly to the fact that the intent was to include
not only labor organizations but all types of associations, we
also take an alternative view that if this Court believes that
the Law is sufficiently obscure as to require aid outside the
language itself, then Exhibit 1 should be considered and viewed
with the significance herein discussed.
With the foregoing interpretive rules and aids we now
proceed to an analysis of the statute, confining ourselves to
21
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an analysis of the language itself in the legislative setting
then existing in this Country.
POINT III
POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES OF UTAH COUNTY, ARE A TYPE OF ASSOCIATION AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE ACT.
The Utah Right to Work Law is unique. When enacted
tn February, 1955, there were 16 states which had already
adopted and retained such laws, but the intent, purpose, and
language of the Utah Law manifested a sharp departure from
all other such laws in the scope of its coverage. In all the
other states, the application of the right-to-work policy was
limited to ( 1) labor organizations and (2) private industry,
whereas, the Utah Law is not so limited, but includes any other
type of association and also public employment.
A list of the phrasing as to the area covered by the rightto-work laws in these other states as of February, 1955, follows:
Alabama: ((labor union or labor organization" SLL 10:285
Arizona: "labor organization" SLL 12:276
Arkansas: "labor unions" SLL 13:291
Florida: Hany labor union or labor organization" SLL
19:285

Georgia: "a labor organization" SLL 20: 191
Iowa: ((any labor union, labor association or labor organization" SLL 25:195
Mississippi: "any labor union or labor organization" SLL
34:283

Nebraska: "a labor organization" SLL 37:291
Nevada: ((a labor organization" SLL 38-287
22
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North Carolina: "any labor union or labor organization"
SLL 43:285
North Dakota: ccany labor union or labor organization"
SLL 44:276
South Dakota: "any labor union or labor organization"
SLL 52:267
South Carolina: "any labor union or labor organization"
SLL 51:285
Tennessee: "any labor union or employee organization of
any kind" SLL 53:278
Texas: "a labor union" SLL 54:281
Virginia: ((any labor union or labor organization" SLL
57:271

In using the term labor union or labor organization some
states define the term. Texas has such a definition, and then
adds, ((and shall not include associations and organizations
not commonly regarded as labor unions."
It is apparent from these laws that they do not apply to
the state government or to any of the states' political subdivisions. Employers are usually referred to as persons, associations or corporations in a context restricted to employers
and employees in private industry. Georgia specifically excludes
from the statute's applictaion ((the state, or any political subdivision thereof". So these statutes offer obvious warnings to
the legislative draftsman if the intent was to be restrictive
as to the area of its coverage.
Now, how does Utah react to all of these significant guides?
First, instead of saying cclabor union or labor organization,"
and then stopping as does every other state, Utah deliberately
extends the area of coverage beyond labor unions and labor
organizations by adding the significant phrase-significant in
23
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view of the above: rror any other type of association." Then,
not content to be unique in this respect, the Legislature again
sharp! y departs from the sixteen states and defines employer
so as to C(include all persons, firms, associations, corporations,
the State of Utah, its counties, cities, school districts and other
political subdivisions."
If the Legislature wanted to restrict the application of
the law to an employee's membership in unions only, as it was
restricted in other states, how easy it would have been to
plain! y do so by using language similar to the then existing
legislation in those states. By adopting the provisions referred
to above which were, and still are, peculiar only to the Utah
Law, it is made very plain that the Legislature wanted to
part company with the other states, and really make the right·
to-work policy nondiscriminatory and of general application
so as to apply also to an employee's membership in any other
type of association.
In 34-1-2, U.C.A., 1953, our labor laws had already defined
a labor organization. Such an organization, as defined, is not
difficult to identify. The Legislature either meant to restrict
the coverage to a labor organization or it meant not to so
restrict it. If it meant to so restrict it, there is no reasonable
or logical explanation for the phrase in controversy and for
its marked departure from the language of the laws of the
other states. If in addition to labor organizations it meant
also to cover associations other than labor unions, then the
language is meaningful and will not do violence to the rules
of statutory construction heretofore rendered by this Court,
and can be used to effect the important declaration of policy
in the Law. We believe that we can demonstrate that this is
24
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a reasonable Law and an improvement over those laws from
which the Legislature so obviously departed.
This Law must be read and studied in the light of its very
strong policy statement. This gives us a sure guide as to what
was intended. The policy reads:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
of Utah that the right of persons to work, whether
in private employment or for the State of Utah, its
counties, cities, school districts or other political subdivisions, shall not be denied or abridged on account
of membership or non-membership in any labor union,
labor organization OR ANY OTHER TYPE OF ASSOCIATION; FURTHER, THAT THE RIGHT TO
WORK MUST BE PROTECTED AND MAINTAINED FREE FROM UNDUE RESTRAINTS AND
COERCION."
So what is it then that was intended? Simply this: That
whatever other causes may deprive one of work, his membership
or non-membership in an association-any type of association
-was not to be the cause of such deprivation. What kind of
association is involved? Any kind where membership or nonmembership therein can be used as a basis for denying or
abridging the right to work. It makes no difference what
functions such an association may perform. The Legislature
was not concerned about the purposes or activities of an association to which an employee might belong. It wanted to
assure a man his freedom to join or refrain from joining an
association of whatever type he chose, civil, fraternal, political,
religious, etc., because that was his own private business and
concern which, as a free citizen, he had a right to exercise;
and that in the exercise of the right to join an association
25
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and in becoming a member thereof, his right to work was not
to be abridged or denied because of membership or non-membership therein. The reasoning of the Legislature undoubtedly
was that what a man does in his private life, independent of
his daily work, is a matter which is entirely irrelevant to a
man's ability to serve as an employee, and therefore ought
not, in any way, to penalize him in his relations with his
employer, certainly, at least, to the extent of depriving him
of that employment.
That Utah should be the State to enlarge the area of
application of the right-to-work concept to include associations
other than labor associations is not surprising in view of the
traditional feeling in this state concerning the divine right
of free agency to every individual in all phases of life. This
view was recently expressed by President David 0. McKay
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. His opinion
as to state right-to-work laws had been sought by the United
States Chamber of Commerce. In a letter directed to the
Chamber, dated June 23, 1961, and signed by Joseph Anderson,
Secretary of the First Presidency, we read:
((I am directed by President David 0. McKay, president of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
to advise you that we stand for the Constitution of the
United States, and for all rights secured thereby to both
sovereign states of the Union and to the individual
citizen.
UWe believe it is fundamental that the right to voluntary unionism should once again be re-established
in this nation and that state right-to-work laws should
be maintained inviolate.

((At the very basis of all our doctrine stands the right
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to the free agency of man. We are in favor of maintaining this free agency to the greatest extent possible.
We look upon any infringement thereof not essential
to the proper exercise of police power of the state
adversely." Salt Lake Tribune, Sunday, September 17,
1961.
President McKay's view that free agency should be maintained to the greatest extent possible and that ANY infringement thereof is looked upon adversely certainly reflects one
of the most basic teachings of the people of this State from
its earliest history and also mirrors the broad application of
the Law's policy when it states: "further, that the right to
work must be protected and maintained free from undue restraints and coercion."
When Utah passed its Right to Work Law not one of the
states that had such laws had any language to compare with
the language above quoted. Arkansas' policy speaks of ((Freedom of organized labor," and Texas' policy speaks of ((The
inherent right of a person to work and bargain freely with
his employer," but none speak in the GENERAL language
of the Utah Law, which makes no attempt to restrict the
meaning to organized labor or to the specific right of a person
to bargain with his employer. In our Law there is no limitation.
It is simply that a man's right to work must be protected
from undue restraint and coercion under ANY circumstance.
And in no state would one be more like! y to find such a generalized approach to the problem than in Utah where the people
have traditionally and with great fervor believed in the divine
source of their free agency in all aspects of life. We venture
the opinion that few, if any, state legislatures could be per27
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suaded to enact what this State has enacted by this Law, and
that the reason for it does indeed rest in the belief of the people
of Utah to which we here allude.
In speaking of the policy of this State that the right to
work should be protected and maintained free from undue
restraint and coercion, where, we ask, can one find a greater
tendency to violate the spirit of this policy than in the employment practices of our governmental agencies ? Where, in fact,
can we look to find a more flagrant violation of this policy
than in the wholesale firing of the petitioners on the day after
the new political regime was sworn into office in Utah County
on January 3, 1961? There is not one word of criticism in
the entire record of the quality and excellence of the work
which these petitioners had been rendering Utah County. On
the contrary, there is strong commendation of the work and
service which they had performed while employed by the
County. (R. 32, 40).
In view of such facts as are present in this case showing,
as they do, such an aggravated abuse of a policy so simply
and emphatically stated without reservations or limitations,
how can our courts resist granting relief from such conduct?
Note that after we read ttor any other type of association,"
there is a semicolon, then (:FURTHER, that the right to work
must be protected and maintained free from undue restraints
and coercion." This general language should leave no doubt
as to the generality of the word uassociations," for the quoted
phrase is entirely free of limitation. This is a significant
contrast with the two states which speak of a policy of freedom
of organized labor or of the freedom of a person to bargain
28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with his employer. Our State is concerned about the freedom
of ALL labor to have their work protected and maintained
even including government labor from undue restraints and
coercion by virtue of their membership and activities in any
type of association.
In view of the general nature of the language used in this
Law, it is appropriate to remind ourselves of Article I, Section
24 of the Constitution of Utah: "All laws of a general nature
shall have uniform operation." If this Law, therefore, is to
apply to any labor it must apply to all labor. In this State a
man is free to belong to any association without fearing that
such affiliation shall influence his obtaining or retaining a job.
EFFECT OF LAW
If, as the Trial Court states, it would be "absurd" to
include political parties within the meaning of association,
it presumably and perhaps necessarily follows that the inclusion
of any other type of association would be at least equally
absurd. And, of course, it has been organized labor's view
that this law as applied to labor is absurd.
But let us analyze how the statute works. When an association is involved, how it is involved? Actually the association
itself is never involved. What is involved is a dispute between
an employer and an employee as to a particular grievance only,
which is: Does the employee belong to some association that
is obnoxious to the employer or does the employee not belong
to some association to which the employer would like him
to belong? The association itself and the employee's membership or lack of membership therein is a fact which this Law
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says shall not influence the employer-employee relationship;
at least such fact cannot be a cause for denying or abridging
the right of an employee to work for his employer. The
grievance, the dispute, the rights of action, the liability-all
exist between, and relate to, the employer and employee, and
in no way involves the association to which the employee is or
is not affiliated.
The application of the law may be illustrated by one's
membership in a union. When an employee joins a union he
does so for the purpose of supporting the joint effort of all
the employees in obtaining better wages and working conditions. This law says that the employer cannot dismiss that
employee for becoming or remaining a member of that union.
As we understand it, respondents do not object to this part
of the law. Yet in such a case it is very much a matter of
concern to the employer because if a majority of his employees
vote to have a union represent them as their collective bargaining. agent, the employer is going to have pressure on him to
divide a greater share of his profits with them.
In this case the particular right to work that has been
denied is the right of certain county employees to work for
Utah County, and the denial is due to their membership or
non-membership in a political association. Of all types of
associations, other than labor organizations, that can have an
influence on a man's right to work, probably none has had so
much influence on that right than has our political parties.
Judging from experience, none will come as close to a labor
union situation as \vill a political party. This is because victorious political candidates traditionally have even gone beyond
30
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union shop principles and have often demanded not only that
a job holder under his administration become a member of his
political party, but have further insisted that the appointee
already belong to the party before he gets his job. In other
wards, they have followed a closed-shop practice, a practice
which is outlawed as to unions both in the Taft-Hartley Act
and also by our own State Law.
Under a statement of policy so strong as is the statement
of our right-to-work policy, and under phrasing throughout the
entire Law that so consistently and obviously includes, ccany
other type of association," can there be any serious question
but that the Legislature intended to include political parties?
If this law is a good and reasonable law as to an employee's membership in a labor union, a fortiori, it is a good
and reasonable law as to an employee's membership in ((any
other type of association." In applying the general policy of
this law to a given employer-employee relationship, it makes
no difference with what functions and objectives the association
to which the employee belongs is involved. This law says such
considerations must not be the cause of terminating that
employer-employee relationship. Other reasons, yes, but not
this reason. Freedom, says the Legislature, includes the right
to join or refrain from joining any type of association, and
the right to work for an employer, without the exercise of either
right affecting the other.
When the Legislature used the word ((association" to
include all other groups, it used a word peculiarly applicable
to a political party. If there are those who would, although
illogically, attempt to convince us that the word ((association"
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does not apply to the major political parties in this County,
State and Nation, they will find no support from the political
philosophers, nor from the legal encyclopedias, nor from the
cases.
From 29 CJS 107 (para. 84) we read:
((Political parties result from voluntary assoctatzon
of electors and not from operation of law; and are
political rather than governmental instrumentalities,
since such parties are the creation of free men, according to their own wisdom, and in no sense whatever
the creation of any department of the government."
The leading case on this subject is Bell v. Hill, 74 S W 2nd
113, 114 (1934). This was a petition by some negroes asking
that they be permitted to vote in the primaries of the Democratic
Party in Texas. In discussing the problem, the Court said:
((In order that we may understand the questions
involved in this case, it is essential that we clearly
comprehend the nature of a political party, such as the
Democratic Party. First of all, it is a voluntary association; an association formed of the free will and
unrestrained choice of those who compose it. No man
is compelled by law to become a member of a political
party; or, after having become such, to remain a member. He may join such a party for whatev~r reason
seems good to him, and may quit the party for any
cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without cause. A
political party is the creation of free _men, acting according to their own wisdom, and in no sense whatever
the creation of any department of the government."
* * * (The court then quotes at length from 49 CJ p
1075 and emphasizes by italics the ((voluntary association" aspect thereof.)
32
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The Court says much more concerning political parties as
associations a~d in so doing quotes at great length from De
Tocqueville' s nDemocracy in America" (first published in
1837). The court comments that De Tocqueville nnoted at
length the celerity with which voluntary associations were
formed by the people of the United States for political and
other purposes, and the effect which these associations had,
not only on governmental affairs, but on social and business
endeavors as well." 'fhe Court then quotes from De Tocqueville
as follows:
nln no country in the world has the principle of
association been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multiple of different objects,
than in America. * * *
nAn association consists simply in the public assent
which a number of individuals give to certain doctrines; and in the engagement which they contract to
promote the spread of those doctrines by their exertions. * * *
tcThe second degree in the right of association is the
power of meeting * * * men have the opportunity of
seeing each other; means of execution are more readily
combined; and opinions are maintained with a degree
of warmth and energy which written language cannot
approach.
nlastly, in the exercise of the right of political association, the partisans of an opinion may unite in
electoral bodies, and choose delegates to represent
them in a central assembly. * * *
nln America the liberty of association for political
purposes is unbounded.'' * * *
CCThe most natural privilege of man, next to the
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right of acting for himself, is that of combining his
exertions with those of his fellow creatures, and of
acting in common with them. I am therefore led to
conclude that the right of association is almost as inalienable as the right of personal liberty. No legislator
can attack it without impairing the very foundation
of society." * * *
((There is only one country on the face of the earth
where the citizens enjoy unlimited freedom of association for politi~al purposes. This same country is
the only one in the world where the continued exercise
of the right of association has been introduced into
civil life, and where all the advantages which civilization can confer are procured by means of it.
In all the countries where political associations
are prohibited, civil associations are rare. It is hardly
probable that this is the result of accident; but the
inference should rather be, that there is a natural and
perhaps a necessary connection between these two kinds
of associations."
n

((Civil associations, therefore, facilitate political
association; but on the other hand, political association
singular! y strengthens and improves associations for
civil purposes. * * * Political life makes the love and
practice of association more general; it imparts a desire
of union, and teaches the means of combination to
numbers of men who would have always lived apart."

***
((Political associations may therefore be considered
as large free schools, where all the members of the
community go to learn the general theory of association.''
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CONCLUSION
lnasn1uch as the trial court was satisfied with the merits
of the petitioners' case as to the facts and the law on all points
except as to the one problem of interpreting the phrase "any
other type of association," we have confined our attention to
this problem. We take the general position that the phrase does
indeed mean any type of association, and specifically, that
whatever type of association it does or does not include, surely
it must include political associations because of their traditional and well-recognized influence upon the acquiring and
retention of jobs in our various bodies of government. The
influence of political associations in this respect is not unlike
the influence of unions, and to whatever extent, whether great
or small, that any association has such influence, just to that
extent did the Legislature intend this right-to-work law to be
effective. With this view of the matter, the trial Court clearly
erred in assuming that the intent of the Law was not to include
political parties within the meaning of associations. The relief
sought by petitioners should be granted, namely that the damages which the Court has already assessed, together with any
other damage which the petitioners can show since the trial, be
granted the petitioners,
and they, and each of them, be restored
,.
to their employment with Utah County.
1{espectfully submitted,
ALLEN L. HODGSON
CLARENCE M. BECK
A. PARK SMOOT
417 Felt Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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APPENDIX
J. BRACKEN LEE, called as a witness by and on behalf
of the Petitioners, was sworn and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BECK:
Q. Mayor, would you state for the record your residence and present occupation and name?
A. My name is J. Bracken Lee. My occupation is, at the
present time, is Mayor of Salt Lake City. My address
is 2031 Laird Drive, Salt Lake City.
Q. How long, approximately have you been a resident
of Salt Lake City?
A. Thirteen years.
Q. Prior to your tenure as Mayor of Salt Lake City, Mr.
Lee, did you hold any executive position with the
State of Utah?
A. I did.
Q. Will you state what it was?
A. I was, served as Governor of the State of Utah from
1949 to January 195 7.
Q. I invite your attention, Mayor, to a session of the
Legislature in about 195 5 that enacted a certain
measure or measures, affecting generally the employee-employer relationship and ask you if you
36
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remember specifically a bill commonly known and
styled as the Right to Work Bill?
A. I do.
Q. In other words, the short title of that bill was known
as Right to Work?

A. That is right.
Q. Was that bill enacted during your tenure as Chief
Executive of the State of Utah?

A. It was.
Q. Did you sign that bill into law ?

A. I did.
Q. Did you conduct any meetings by yourself through
committees or otherwise respecting, affecting the
enactment of that right to work bill?

A. Yes. Many meetings.
Q. Could you state with whom and for what purpose
you held such meetings ?

A. Yes.
Q. I mean just generally.

A. To discuss the merits of the bill with members of
the different labor unions. The state head of the
labor unions, a committee from the House. A committee from the Senate. And different groups of
legislators.
Q. During the progress, prior to the enactment, and
what I want to get at is the historical background
of the bill as it was then in development and being
written and approaching enactment, what was primarily the purpose of you convening these respective meetings ? Committee meetings and otherwise?
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A. The first, well I might say that I had a number of
meetings with Ross Thoreson.
Q. Will you state who Ross Thoreson was and what
his function was in the enactment of this bill ?
A. He was a member of the legislature and the one
who sponsored the bill. I talked to him, a number
of legislators. They asked me what I would do if
this bill was passed, and I told them that I would
sign the bill.
MR. TAYLOR: We object to that and ask that it be
stricken as hearsay.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. The answer
is ordered stricken.
Q. I understood you to say that Ross Thurman, Ross
Thoreson was the sponsor of the Right to Work
bill?
A. One of the sponsors, yes.
Q. Did he attend some meetings respecting enactment
of this bill in your office during the time, the process
of its being enacted?
A. He did.
Q.If you know, for what purpose did he meet with you
and others?
A. To determine the attitude, my attitude toward the
bill.
I

MR. TAYLOR: We object to that question and the
answer on the grounds that it is immaterial, hearsay.
THE COURT: Well, he doesn't quote anything. He
simply states what the purpose was so it wouldn't
be hearsay exactly.
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MR. TAYLOR: We fail to see the materiality, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: What do you claim for it?
MR. BECK: Merely preliminary, if Your Honor please.
THE COURT: Preliminary to what?
MR. BECK: To the introduction of an exhibit and two
more questions.
THE COURT: Well, let the answer remain.
MR. BECK: I might state generally this, Your Honor,
in all frankness. We have been through at least
three different sessions respecting this case respecting law points, and the primary purpose of that is
to place before Your Honor and in the record the
position of somebody that was present during the
history of the time the bill was enacted, in other
words legislative history.
THE COURT: Well, can you prove legislative history
that way?
MR. BECK: I would state this generally, if Your Honor
please, that legislative history may be proven by one
who sponsors a bill, a committeeman who participates in it, by legislative entries and by official communications issued or adopted during the process of
the time the bill was enacted. However, I will state
that this would be, this is preliminary and if counsel
want to make an objection I thinkTHE COURT, Well, he answered the question, let it
remain and you may proceed.

Q. Now during that time, Mayor, did you yourself
actively participate in the drafting of the Right to
Work bill as it was ultimately passed and became
law?
39
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Yes, a portion of it.

Q. What portion did you, what portion of the bill
did you actively participate in the writing of?
A. That portion, which set forth those who would be
affected by the bill.

Q. Now was the circle of those that would be affected
by the bill reduced or enlarged as a result of your
amendment?
MR. CORNABY: We object to that as immaterial, if
Your Honor please.
THE COURT: I don't see the materiality.
MR. BECK: The purpose behind that question, if Your
Honor please, was to, was to elicit just exactly what
the issue was during the time the bill was in process
of being enacted by the people who were charged
with enac;ting the bill.
(Discussion between Court and Counsel.)
MR. BECK: I might shorten this just a little probably
by-Then counsel can make a more formal objection.
May this be marked.

Q. Mayor Lee, I invite your attention to what has been
marked for identification in this case as Petitioner's
Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if that appears to be a
facsimilie of your signature on the bottom?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And was that an official communication that was
sent out by you during the time you were chief
executive of the State of Utah explaining the Right
to Work Bill that we have under examination today?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know approximately how many copies of
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that communication were sent out? Just guess, or
just an estimate.
A. Better than a hundred.
Q. Do you know the reason it was sent out?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us please?

A. To explain my reasons for supporting the bill. And
to set forth-
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